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Housing the refugees: The Greek experience and its political pitfalls.  
 
Immigration and economic immigrants  
In the 20
th century the mass movements of population (concerning mainly the 
geographic mobility for economic reasons) acquired big importance, and they 
influenced national and international policies. 
      
One result of the big immigratory currents of the 20
th century was the uprooting 
of approximately 400 million people from their homes and their relocation in 
foreign homelands, with the hope for a better future. Within these immigratory 
currents are included mainly the economic immigrants but also, in a much smaller 
percentage, all types of refugees (political, religious, etc.). 
  
Most important is that this human ‘river’ grows continuously (with a dramatic 
increase of rate) as time passes: from 1.5 million immigrants annually in the 
beginning of the century to 10 million immigrants annually in the last decade 
(1990-2000). 
 
Thus, as this phenomenon extends into the 21
st century, we become witnesses of 
a new immigratory ‘opening’ of USA and Europe as a way of confronting the 
ageing of their population and the need to maintain a balance between the 
economically active and the pensioners (today the proportion is 4,5:1). According 
to certain estimates (The Guardian, 18-6-2002)  the European Union accepts 
each year 1.2 million legal and illegal immigrants.   
 
It is obvious that globalisation encourages and strengthens these developments. 
Based on this logic, in Germany, France and Austria immigration is considered 
again as useful (Alain Morice CNRS, Le Monde Diplomatique No.153, Jan. 2001). 
Indeed, it is a change of mentality. Already, from the Meeting of Nice, the 
designated commissioner of the European Union called upon the country 
members to recognize that the policy of ‘zero immigration’ applied for the last 25 
years is not functional any more and that they should follow a more open policy. 
 
However, the new attitude for immigration does not automatically and obviously 
ensure the social support of immigrants, or of their various types of human 
rights. The conditions of residence, work, education, recreation, and other 
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aspects of their life are problematic. Thus, the freedom of movement of people 
(as workforce) that is encouraged by the ongoing increasing world economic 
completion, is circumvented by the restrictions and the conditions that are 
imposed by national policies. 
 
The situation in Greece  
Concerning the economic immigration, at the end of the 20
th century, from a 
country of despatch Greece is changed into a country of reception. The same 
occurred to other Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy. This 
change happened mainly during the 70s and 80s because of the economic growth 
that was then taking place. The flows to Europe, North America and Australia 
(that had occurred during the period between the two World Wars at the 
beginning of the 20
th century and the period immediately after the Second World 
War) stopped and the flows from Central and Eastern Europe, and Middle East 
begun. Henceforth, the migratory balance is positive. 
 
Thus, from the beginning of the 90s  –  after the fall of the central and Eastern 
Europe communistic regimes, as well as the political realignments in the Near and 
Middle East –  Greece began to accept masses of immigrants from its northern 
and eastern borders most of which are assuredly illegal. Both the Greek 
authorities and the Greek society were unprepaired and surprised by this event, 
with unfavourable results for the immigrants and the Greek citizens alike. It is 
evident that with the 1991 legislation (law 1975/91) immigration (under the 
pretext of illegal immigration) was placed ‘under persecution’ in all fields of daily 
life (municipalities, schools, insurance and finance institutions, etc). Greece is the 
country with the relatively smaller number of legal immigrants and consequently 
it has the biggest – per capita  –  problem of illegal immigration! 
 
The institutional frame  
The immigratory legislation of the Greek state in the modern era begins with law 
1975/91 (that replaced the initial law 4310/1929, after sixty two years of 
existence) and its specialised application was fine-tuned by a series of 
Presidential Decrees and Ministerial decisions. This law determines the legal 
frame for the control of frontier crossings, entry or exit of persons,  stay, work, 
and the deportation of foreigners. 
  
In 1996 came to force law 2452/96 which modifies the previous law and places 
onto a new base the policy on immigration. Specifically, the presidential decrees 
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authorized by this law (PD 358/97 and PD 359/97) regulate the processes of 
legalisation of  the immigrants (provisional and limited stay immigration cards, 
etc). 
 
Roughly, after a five-year period law 2452/96 was replaced by law 2910/2001 
(‘Entry and stay of foreigners in the Greek territory. Possession of Greek 
citizenship and other provisions.’) which was also modified by a recent law 
(3013/2002).   
 
More specifically with this law, and amongst other things, the following are 
determined:  
‘In each regional administration of foreigners and immigration a three-member 
Immigration Committee is recommended, which is constituted by two employees 
of service of foreigners and immigration, from which the one is its head, and one 
representative of the police force. The Regional General Secretary appoints the 
members of the Committee, regular and reserve, and the secretary with his 
assistant... The Regional General Secretary’s ruling could recommend in each 
regional administration of foreigners and immigration moreover up to two three-
member Immigration Committees, provided that they are needed for a quicker 
completion of their work.’  ‘The Immigration Committee’s job is the formulation of 
opinion for the issuing or the renewal of  stay permissions to immigrants…’  
(article 9). 
 
‘Entry of a foreigner in Greece for study in Higher Education Institutions (A.E.I.), 
Technological Educational Institutions (T.E.I), in “Higher Religous Faculties and 
Religious School Units”, in the Higher Faculty of Teachers of Mechanical Engineers 
of the Faculty of Educational Functional Professional and Technical Education, in 
the Higher Faculty of Tourist Professions of E.O.T., in Technical Professional 
Schools (T.E.E.), in the school of the Greek language of the Universities of Athens 
or Thessaloniki or in the Centre of Greek Language Thessaloniki is allowed, 
provided that the foreigner had already received permission of entry for this 
reason. Included in the list of studies are the first degrees and the postgraduate 
degrees, as well as possesion of a speciality as in the case of medical studies’  
(article 10). 
 
‘Entry of a foreigner in Greece for training in public or private educational centres 
(I.E.K.) is allowed provided that the foreigner is accepted by them and is granted 
a relevant approval of study by the Institution of Professional Education and 
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Training’. ‘Entry of a foreigner in Greece for the study of... programs in 
laboratories of free study is allowed, provided that the foreigner has been 
accepted by them and that the relevant laboratory certification stating that the 
foreigner is accepted for the duration of the relevant program is approved by the 
relevant service of that Prefectoral Authority’ (article 14).  
 
From the above continuous changes in the legislation it appears, on the one 
hand, the speed of developments in the immigratory movement and, on the other 
hand, the inexperience, improvisation and haphazard treatment by the Greek 
state. Thus, for example, the severity of provisions in at least the initial laws, 
contributed in the reproduction of illegal immigration. It appears that the 
legislator did not comprehend that Greece had been changed de facto into a 
country of reception of immigrants, given that the emphasis was initially placed 
on policing and deportation. And that was so despite the explicit constitutional 
arrangements for the protection of rights of all that live and work in the country. 
Following the above some positive measures were taken such as the legalization 
of immigrants and the transference of the centre of exercise of immigratory policy 
to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Administration, as well as the 
completion of  the 1st business program for immigrants and the formation of the 
Immigratory Policy Institute which, however, is at its very early stage. 
 
Quantitative and statistical data  
The basic information useful for the observation of the phenomenon are the 
development in time of the total flow of immigrants, and their geographic 
distribution in their Greek geographic and administrative units (Regions, 
prefectures), both as a percentage of the total of immigrants at a national level 
and as a percentage of the population for each administrative unit. In addition, 
there is certain basic information from the profile of immigrants (country of 
origin, education, profession, age, sex, etc.).  
 
Data of immigration to Greece are presented in the census by the beginning of 
the 80s. More specifically in the 1991 and 2001 census we observe the following 
results: 
 
1991             167,276     foreigners  
2001             797,093     foreigners  
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Various estimates that are based on OAED’s data (Organization for the 
Employment of the Workforce) and on the ‘application for residence’ increase the 
number of immigrants roughly to 1,000,000 out of which a large number are 
illegal. It deserves to be reported that according to the UN, the population of 
Greece in 2015 is forecasted to reach 14.2 million people from which 3-3.5 million 
will be foreigners - immigrants comming from countries other than the European 
Union (IAPAD’s Study for the immigrants).  
 
According to the report of the National Observatory for the employment and the 
recent census of the National Statistical Service we have the following 
information:  
 
As for the country of origin of immigrants at the top of the list are the Albanians 
with roughly 65%. The rest is distributed in various Balkan countries and the 
Middle East (Bulgaria, Romania, Pakistan, etc).   
Regarding the age of immigrants there is a relatively large concentration between 
30 and 35 years of age, while the overwhelming majority is concentrated in the 
productive ages.  
As for the educative level, 50% are graduates of secondary education while the 
9% of higher education.  
Based on the recent 2001 census the distribution of foreigners at regional level is 
as follows. 
 
Table 1 Distribution of Foreigners (immigrants) in the Greek regions (GD) 
  
 Geographical Departments  (GD)   Number of immigrants  % of TP of  immigrants 
Grater Athens Area   376.732  47.26 
Central Greece and Evoia   49. 187   6.10 
Peloponissos    81.679   7.07 
Ionian islands     20.524   2.57 
Epirus    17.067   2.14 
Thessaly    33.782   4.23 
Macedonia 125.973  15.80 
Thrace       5.743    0.72 
Egean Islands   40.911   5.13 
Creta   45.495   5.70 
Total   797.093  100.00 
Source: Census 2001, National Statistical Service 
TP= Total Population of foreigners-immigants in Greece 
GD= Geographical Department 
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Table 2. Foreigners-Immigrants as per % of the total population of each region 
 
 Geographical Departmenet  (GD)   Number of immigrants  % of TP of  each GD 
Grater Athens Area   376.732   10.01 
Central Greece and Evoia   49. 187     5.92 
Peloponissos    81.679     7.07 
Ionian islands     20.524     9.63 
Epirus    17.067     4.82 
Thessaly    33.782     4.48 
Macedonia  125.973     5.19 
Thrace       5.743     1.58 
Egean Islands   40.911     8.04 
Creta   45.495     7.56 
 Total   797.093     7.24  of TP of Greece 




Spatial planning and infrastructures of support for immigrants. Problems  
and possibilities of guarantee of sufficient housing.  
Immigration to Greece mainly in the 90s occurred in two ‘waves’. The first 
between 1991-97 and the second after 1997. The immigrants of the first wave 
had come aiming at a direct economic profit with the hope of some returning to 
their homelands. Their living conditions were in general very bad. They resided in 
old and abandoned houses without basic services of common utility (water, 
electricity, etc.) and with high occupancy density. The immigrants of the second 
wave are of older age, they have    much better living conditions and their 
expectation is that of a permanent stay and integration into the Greek society.  
 
As we observe in the above tables the immigrants mainly settle in the region of 
the capital 47%. The attraction exerted on the immigrants by the urban regions is 
justified not only by the need of easier access to the job market and the 
satisfaction of their economi c  n e e d s .  I t  i s  a l s o  e x p l ained through cultural and 
social reasons because in the city exists the possibility of easier communication, 
transmission of experiences and social aggregation between themselves and, 
therefore, preservation of their culture. There is also the possibility of better 
integration in the local society through the services and activities (recreational, 
athletic, educational, etc.)  that are offered in the city. Of course that does not 
mean that the immigrants always make use of these possibilities. 
 
However, independent from the above, the fact is that the urban infrastructures 
and services for the immigrants in Greece are generally insufficient. Mainly, these 
infrastructures are not considered to be ‘suitable’ for the immigrants (e.g. 
problems with the ‘cross-cultural’ schools).  
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Regarding the housing situation and in relation to the other European countries, it 
should be stressed that in Greece the proportion of the immigrant population not 
housed is very high due to lack of government care. According to research 
estimates this housing deprivation concerns the 2/3 of the immigrant population 
(IAPAD). The conditions of lack of housing are related to conditions of insecurity 
such as the unregistered renting of residences, the subletting from immigrants to 
other immigrants with its many consequences, the evictions, blackmails and 
threats of householders mainly against the illegal immigrants, the dependence on 
employers that offer roof and breach working rights of immigrants, the lack of 
basic comforts of hygiene, the ill-treatment of minors and women, the distribution 
of narcotics, the lack of health care etc. 
 
On the other hand examining law 2910/2001 we observe that as a criterion for 
the issuing of entry permission it is statutary for the immigrant to have ensured 
some lodging, however without reference on the conditions and type of lodging 
based on the international conventions ratified by Greece for the human and 
social rights (Statement of Human Rights, article 25, and European Social 
Charter, article 31). Also, in the law there is no mention of the basic 
constitutional rights concerning the obligation of the state to ensure sufficient 
housing to all legal residents of the country.   
Certainly, the application of housing and other rights requires planning and the 
bringing together of suitable mechanisms targeting primarily the legal immigrants 
in order to aid them in the access of safe, secure and sufficient housing. 
 
According to IAPAD’s study, the basic objective should be the planning of an 
institutional frame and specifications for the support of housing, as well as the 
creation of relevant pilot units that will basically have a preventive role. Particular 
care should be given to the frail and sucsceptible groups of immigrants through 
the provision of a social residence. The necessary actions for the implementation 
of the objectives should be undertaken by institutions that have the suitable 
know-how on built-up development and urban and social planning issues (e.g. 
DEPOS  – the Public Enterprise of Urban Planning and Accommodation, Research 
Centres and Consultant researches). 
 
Even if the region of application of the above activities is the entire Greek 
territory, particular emphasis should be given to the metropolitan regions of 
Athens and Thessaloniki as well as the pilot application in two frontier regions. 
Finally, key to the success of the undertaken activities is the creation of housing 
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units of support and mediation in the prefectures presenting accentuated 
problems of accommodation of immigrants. 
 
Repatriating Refugees 
According to the Greek legislation, immigrants who arrived and resided in Greece 
since late ´80s and after the collapse of the socialist states in Europe can be 
distinguished in two categories: the ones of Greek origin and the ones without it. 
And one could see a clear difference in policies aiming to accommodate the 
“repatriating Greeks” in their new environment, than the ones targeted to the 
other immigrants, the former being more in variety, more elaborated and better 
financed than the latter. Here it should be noted that the officially used term 
“repatriating” is not correct, since the vast majority of these immigrants have 
never before lived in Greece, being the descendents of ancient Greek colonies, 
created in the area since the 8
th century AC. The term could apply only to a 
minority of first generation political exiles who expatriated in Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet Union during the period 1946-1949, due to the Civil War, and now, 
they were allowed to come back. 
 
When talking about “repatriating refugees”, the reference is mainly made about 
two periods of the contemporary Greek history: The 1922 Asia Minor disaster, 
when 1.3 million Greeks living in Ottoman Empire were “exchanged” with 500000 
Turks living in Greek territory (to be precise, the critical characteristics for the 
identity of the “exchanged” were not the ethnic identities bur the religious 
affiliations i.e. Christian Orthodox versus Muslims), and the early 1990s, with the 
influx of populations from Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union to Greece, 
after the collapse of communist regimes and the ethnic tensions that arose there 
right after. Quantitatively, there should be no comparison between these two 
periods, since the 1.3 million refugees of 1923 comprised a much more serious 
social problem than the 160000 refugees of the ´90s –furthermore, given the 
specific conditions of each period and the different capabilities due to the time 
span between them. Nevertheless, the outcomes of the assimilation strategy of 
1920s and 1930s seem to be more effective and reliable from the recent one, for 
reasons that will be analyzed later. “Repatriation” –with a more precise meaning 
of the term- was also recorded in Greece during the period 1971-1986. During 
that period, the number of the returning population back to Greece was becoming 
increasingly higher than the emigrating population, which had reached a total of 
almost 12 million since the beginning of the 20
th century. During this period 
1971-1986, 625000 Greek immigrants came back to Greece for staying 
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permanently. This wave, though, did not create the panic and the urgent needs of 
the two mentioned before, since returning Greeks were mostly first generation 
immigrants abroad, with families and relatives still in Greece, and with a clear 
idea about the Greek reality, coming from their frequent visits in the homeland. 
Furthermore, they were skilled, used to function in the same social system as in 
Greece, and financially healthy –and most often better off than the majority of 
the Greek population. Consequently, there was no urgent need for social and 
financial intervention from the part of the public sector, and this period was not 
characterized as one of refugee invasion.   
 
This paper will examine the policies and projects related to providing immediate 
and intermediate shelter and permanent housing for the refugees, the up to now 
outcomes of these policies, and their repercussions for human rights of 
immigrants. This will be given within a general frame describing the 
characteristics of the refugees from former Soviet Union and other East European 
countries, the conditions of their “repatriation”, and the policies and means 
adopted for their assimilation in the Greek society. In context with the above, the 
establishment of E.I.Y.A.P.O.E. (National Foundation of Reception and 
Rehabilitation of Repatriating Expatriate Greeks) –which was the main means of 
exercising housing policies for the refugees- will be analyzed, its function for 
about one decade, and then, its dissolution due to ineffectiveness, 
mismanagement and excessive money consumption.   
 
The initial signs of refugee movements to Greece became evident at 1987, two 
years after the appointment of M. Gorbatsoff in the position of the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At this period, ethnic 
tensions erupted in the then Soviet Union, following a severe economic crisis. The 
situation deteriorated and populations of different ethnic origins were trapped in 
wars in several then Soviet republics. Appeals for help from populations of Greek 
origin at 1989 were followed by visits from the then Greek Minister of External 
Affairs A. Samaras, in the troubled territories, who directed an open and quite 
promising invitation for the “repatriation” of local people of Greek origin to the 
motherland –and even more promising, to the European Union. The motives of 
this invitation have been criticized since, as rather premature, since promises 
were given without any previous preparation which would guarantee their 
materialization. Furthermore, it has also been discarded as a movement to gain 
useful political support from the refugees, having as an example the equivalent 
support that Prime Minister E. Venizelos gained from the 1923 refugees, and with 
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the perspective of nearby national elections. The official Ministerial invitations, 
combined to the lifting of restrictions of movement of Soviet citizens out of Soviet 
Union, provoked an increasingly massive incoming movement of refugees in 
Greece. The number of “repatriating” refugees from the Soviet Republics reached 
155.000 until the year 2000, and they came from Georgia (52%), Kazakhstan 
(20%), Russia (15%) and Armenia (6%). The peak of their arrivals was recorded 
in the period 1992-1993 and the majority of them resided in Northern Greece 
(mainly in Thessalonica) and in the broader area around Athens (Attica). Their 
geographic distribution in Greece and their number of arrivals per year can be 
seen in the following tables. 
 
Region Families  Individuals  Percentage  of 
the total (%) 
Thrace  6583 22984  14.8 
Macedonia  29265 91673 59 
Prefecture of Thessalonica  16174  51139  33 
Rest of Macedonia  13091  40534  26 
Epirus  35 112  0.1 
Thessaly  397 1354  0.9 
Sterea Ellas  10972 33837  21.8 
Prefecture of Attica (Athens)  10779  33204  21.4 
Rest of Sterea Ellas  193  633  0.4 
Peloponnese  321 943  0.6 
Crete  1231 3893  2.5 
Ionian islands  19 57  - 
Aegean islands  157 466  0.3 
Total 48980  155319  100.0 
 
Table 3: Geographic distribution of the repatriating refugees from the former 
Soviet Union in the Greek Regions (sources: General Secretariat of Repatriating 
Expatriate Greeks, 2000a:40-41 and Georgoula et al, 2002:116) 





total arrivals (%) 
1977-1986 334  0.2 
1987 169  0.1 
1988 669  0.4 
1989 5195  3.3 
1990 16716  10.8 
1991 17331  11.2 
1992 19846  12.8 
1993 25720  16.6 
1994 14737  9.5 
1995 14586  9.4 
1996 14298  9.2 
1997 12381  8.0 
1998 5761  3.7 
1999 4676  3.0 
2000 1307  0.8 
Not recorded  1593  1.0 
Total 155319  100.0 
 
Table 4: Arrivals of repatriating refugees from the former Soviet Union per year 
(sources: General Secretariat of Repatriating Expatriate Greeks, 2000a:46 and 
Georgoula et al, 2002:116) 
 
Their criteria of choosing their new residence were the existence of relatives and 
friends in the same area, the possibility of employment, living in a city instead of 
a rural area, and a general impression of relatively better quality of life there 
(General Secretariat of Repatriating Expatriate Greeks, 2000a:44).     
 
Having to face this phenomenon, the then national Greek Government of K. 
Mitsotakis went on establishing the National Foundation of Reception and 
Rehabilitation of Repatriating Expatriate Greeks (N.F.R.R.R.E.G. or EIYAPOE in 
Greek). This was supposed to be a flexible organization, belonging to the wider 
public sector but autonomous from the time consuming state bureaucracy, with 
main task the provision of shelter and housing to the refugees. Here, the 
exclusive target of the foundation should be underlined, supposed to serve only 
the “repatriating expatriate Greeks” and excluding the rest of the immigrants, 
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legal or illegal, who had also come in Greece in vast numbers. It also has to be 
noted that the main focus of the rehabilitation program was on the “repatriating 
expatriates” from the republics of the Soviet Union, these being either residents 
there for centuries, or, a smaller number of first or second generation Greeks who 
fled Greece as left wing partisans after the civil war of 1945-1949 and went to the 
socialist countries as political exiles. Political exiles from other East European 
countries were also allowed to return to Greece after the post dictatorship official 
“national reconciliation policy” of the Greek State1, but they were not part of the 
EIYAPOE rehabilitation program2.   
 
EIYAPOE was established by Law 1893/1990 under the auspices of the Minister of 
External Affairs and its tasks and program were then approved. Two years later, 
with Law 2080/1992, its focus was broadened by including refugees from Albania 
-who, in this period, were flocking in Greece in vast numbers- but still, only for 
the ones of Greek origin. It also undertook the responsibility of providing 
assistance to expatriate Greeks abroad. Thus, according to the new law, EIYAPOE 
had three sectors of activities:  
1.  The program for the repatriating expatriates from former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe,  
2.  The program for Albania and 
3.  The program for providing assistance to expatriate Greeks still living in the 
territories of former Soviet Union. 
 
The 1
st program was divided in three sub sectors: the housing program, which 
was considered as the first priority, the education program and the professional 
training program. The 2
nd program was for planning and materializing activities in 
the regions of Albania with a Greek minority, mainly in the areas of education, 
culture, technical substructures, regional development, professional training, and 
social services. The 3
rd program was about the same activities as above, but for 
regions with a Greek minority in former Soviet Union. As it was stated in the 
beginning, the main focus of this work will be on the housing program for the 
refugees from former Soviet Union and East European countries.   
 
                                                 
1: The military dictatorship in Greece lasted from 1967 to 1974. The post dictatorship political climate 
was generally progressive, and national reconciliation between political left and right was top on the 
political agenda of all the political parties.    
2:  There was no significant general national policy concerning the repatriation and rehabilitation of the 
political exiles and repatriation was examined in an individual basis. Furthermore, there is still a 
category of political exiles, the ones from the Republic of Macedonia who still are not allowed to 
return to Greece due to old territorial disputes.  
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The establishment and function of EIYAPOE seemed to be of major importance for 
the Greek government who also granted it with special privileges in order to 
facilitate its smooth function. Thus, according to Law 1947/1991, it was given 
complete tax exemption, the right to proclaim expropriation for public benefit, 
and to use public land without exchange. 
 
The internal organization of EIYAPOE was also ambitious: it consisted of a Central 
Branch and of “Hospitality Centers”. The Central Branch was organized in eight 
Directorates: Personnel. Finance, Technical Services, Education and Training, 
Supplying and Transportation, Real Estate, Data Processing, and Internal 
Management and Control. “Hospitality Centers” were allocated in three regional 
“Inspectorates”: of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace based in Komotini with 
subdivisions in other three prefectures, of Central Macedonia based in 
Thessalonica with subdivisions in other three prefectures, and of Epirus and West 
Macedonia based in Ioannina with subdivisions in other two prefectures (map 1). 
Few years later, many of those subdivisions seized to operate. 
 




Ministry of External Affairs (Regular 
budget) 
116,041,086 49.9 
Extra subsidies  15,471,753  6.9 
Ministry of Finance  4,501,834  1.9 
Partial Sum  136,014,673  57.7 
Social Rehabilitation Fund of 
European Council (S.R.F.E.C.) 
31,248,716 13.4 
European Union subsidies  20,446,075  8.9 
Subsidies of various organizations  3,753,485  1.6 
Donations 460,748  0.2 
Interest from capital  38,154,072  16.4 
Tax returns / interest  2,074,835  0.9 
Others 334,556  0.1 
TOTAL 232,487,160  100.0 
 
Table 5: EIYAPOE finances and sources of finance 1991 – 2001  
(sources: EIYAAPOE 2002:65, G. Georgoula et al 2002:124) 
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1:  
Finances were also a strong point of the organization, at least at the beginning of 
its function. Sources of finance for EIYAPOE were the Ministries of External Affairs 
and of Finance, the Social Rehabilitation Fund of the European Council 
(S.R.F.E.C.), several European programs, and various other sources such as 
grants, interest from capital, donations etc. The total amount of finances for the 
decade 1991-2001 is shown in Table 5, and the temporal distribution of these 
finances is shown in Table 6. Source of 
finance 
1991-1993  Yearly 
Average 
1994-1999  Yearly 
Average 
2000-2001  Yearly 
Average 






17,168,012  5,722,671    76,868,672 12,811,445    22,004,402 11,002,201    116,041,086 10,549,190 
Extra subsidies  15,383,712  5,127,904    88,041 14,673    - - 15,471,753  1,406,523 
Ministry of 
Finance 





Council   
22,180,484  7,393,495    9,071,167 1,511,862    - - 31,248,716  2,840,792 
European Union 
subsidies 




3,263,390  1,087,797    478,357 79,726    11,738 5,869    3,753,485 341,226 
Donations    334,556 111,519    123,258 20,543    - -    460,748 41,886 
Interest from 
capital 
22,908,290  7,636,097    15,031,548 2,505,258    214,233 107,116    38,154,072 3,468,552 
Tax returns / 
interest 
     
15 
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2,074,835 345,806    - -    2,074,835 188,621 
Others    5,869 1,956    278,797 46,466    49,890 24,945    334,556 30,414 
TOTAL 92,472,486  30,824,162 114,130,596 19,021,766 25,884,078 12,942,039 232,487,160 21,135,196 
(sources: EIYAAPOE 2001:62-65, G. Georgoula et al 2002:125, authors´ elaboration)




The above financial scheme covered all the activities of the organization. Money 
from the Social Rehabilitation Fund of European Council, in particular, were given 
as loans, exclusively for housing projects for the refugees and they were covering 
40% of the total budget of each housing project, while the rest 60% was 
supposed to be covered by national contribution. From table 4 it can be seen that 
during the period 1994 – 1999, incoming money from S.R.F.E.C. were drastically 
reduced, and at 2000 – 2001 they were finally stopped. It was said that this 
happened when European Council officials found out that the money given were 
given to refugees as rent subsidies, instead of constructing permanent 
residences. It can also be observed that EIYAPOE finances followed a relatively 
sharp decline during this decade and the housing sector was particularly hit 
because of the interruption of S.R.F.E.C. loans –among other things. As will be 
seen later, this affected not only the quality of EIYAPOE services but also 
alienated the refugees who felt insecure with the gradual abandonment of a policy 
so crucial to them. A clear indication of the shortage of funds for the housing 
program is that while the total cost of it for the decade 1991 – 2001 was 
estimated at 205,429,200 EURO (EYIAAPOE 1996a:28) from which the 
123,257,520 EURO (60% of the total) should have been the national contribution, 
it was only the amount of 136,014,673 EURO which was given from the part of 
the Greek government to cover all EIYAPOE activities, as shown in table 3. This 
means that only part of this amount went to the program of repatriating 
expatriates from former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and again only part of 
the latter was spent for the housing program.       
 
In fact, despites the initial rhetoric about the increased effectiveness of the new 
organization, there were awkward signs, casting doubts about the reliability of the 
operation right from the beginning. Although the organization and funding of 
EIYAPOE started at 1990, the housing program delayed for more than three 
years, since all planning and constructions of the first Reception Centers for the 
refugees were made by a special service of the Greek army (SYKEA). This service 
preexisted of EIYAPOE, was dealing with reconstruction projects and, according to 
Law 1262/92, was supposed to be automatically dissolved after the establishment 
of EIYAPOE. Nevertheless, even after the establishment of EIYAPOE, the 
construction of the first permanent refugee settlements was also given to SYKEA 
with the 27.2.1992 ministerial decision of the ministers of National Defense and 
of External Affairs, which went on organizing the project, signing contracts and 
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supervising works. This went on until 2.7.1993, when the permanent dissolving of 
SYKEA was announced, and EIYAPOE finally took over (EIYAAPOE, 1996a:59). 
There was speculation that SYKEA was kept for as long as it was needed for some 
developing companies to get contracts for the housing project. Nevertheless, 
when one would expect that even after this delay the Foundation would take over 
in signing contracts, supervising projects etc., it went on granting its own 
responsibilities in running housing projects, to other agencies as DEPOS (National 
Foundation of Housing and Urban Planning) or VIPETVA (the construction branch 
of the   ) which in no case were better suitable for this type of activities. This 
made the ability of the Foundation to intervene in the phases of planning and 
construction too indirect and became harmful for the project. 
 
Housing program of EIYAPOE 
Characteristics and location 
The accession of repatriating refugees in the housing and rehabilitation program 
of EIYAPOE was a matter of personal choice for them. A restrictive term, though, 
was that the ones to be accepted in the program should have their passports 
stamped in the Greek Consulate with the indication “Repatriation”. People on 
tourist visas were not allowed to participate in EIYAPOE programs3. 
 
The first elements of the planning phase of the housing program of EIYAPOE were 
the definition of the stages and structural parts of it, and the specification of 
locations of these parts. According to what was planned, the rehabilitation of 
repatriating expatriates in the sectors of accommodation and housing should 
follow four stages (EIYAAPOE 1996a:36): 
1.  Initial reception in “Hospitality Centers” and stay there for 15 – 30 days4. 
2.  Temporary stay for another period up to six months in “Reception 
Settlements”. 
3.  Moving in rented accommodation and 
4.  Establishment in permanent residences. 
 
                                                 
3: This restriction was lifted later, initially by providing the possibility for the ones on tourist visas to 
get the “repatriating” status from specific civil departments in Greece, and then by extending the right 
to participate in EIYAPOE programs in people who came in Greece on tourist visas before 1/1/2000 
(General Secretariat of Repatriating Expatriate Greeks 2000a:25, 31 and interviews).  
4: According to Law 1893/1990 about the establishment of EIYAPOE, this initial 15 - 30 days stay 
could be prolonged under special circumstances for as long as the Executive Board of EIYAPOE 
would decide. 
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Map 1: Organization and activities of EIYAPOE in Greece 
(source: Tsetsiou 2000:130) 
 
During the first two stages the refugees would stay in a collective environment, 
completely protected and organized in order to get basic assistance and 
information and start an adjustment process in the political, social, economic and 
cultural conditions of their new environment. The other two stages of rented 
accommodation and permanent residences are under conditions of individual, 
independent living, where the adjustment of the refugees to their new life style is 
completed.   
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The location choice for the housing projects was based more in political than in 
social criteria. Although in the initial plans of EIYAPOE was to help refugees settle 
in all Northern Greece5, finally the implementation of all EIYAPOE programs was 
concentrated in Thrace, in Northeastern Greece. The reasons for this were that in 
this area there is a Muslim minority whose political influence and demographic 
increase, the Greek government wanted to counterbalance by directing the 
refugees to reside there6 (Kritikos 2002). The negative elements of this choice 
were that refugees who were residing there, had serious problems in finding 
employment, and this led many of them to avoid joining the program and move 
straight to Thessalonica or Athens. 
 
For the first stage of the program, the first three “hospitality centers” were 
created in Athens (Agios Ioannis Rentis) with a capacity of 250 persons, in 
Thessalonica (Lagadikia) with a capacity of 350 persons and in Thrace (Dionysos 
Evros) with a capacity of 150 persons. The first two were gradually abandoned 
after a short period because of unpredicted problems, since the refugees who 
were accepted there, refused to leave Athens and Thessalonica in order to move 
to Thrace for the second stage of the program. Consequently, the two new 
hospitality centers were made in Thrace: in Soufli and in Dikaia, with capacity of 
200 persons each. Parallel to these, temporary hospitality centers were also 
created during the peak periods of arrivals of refugees, mainly in student hostels 
and in hotels. Most of them were in Thrace, but few of them were also made in 
central Greece (prefectures of Larissa, Imathia, Fthiotida etc.). For these, 
EIYAPOE did not provide any reasoning for the choice of their location, allowing, 
thus, speculation about preferential deals with some hotel owners.  
 
At the second stage of the program, refugees were moved from hospitality 
centers to “Reception Settlements”. Their creation was financed by national 
funds, and loans from Social Rehabilitation Fund of European Council. EIYAPOE 
was the official proprietor of the settlements and their function was in cooperation 
with the local municipalities and prefectures. During their stay there, they could 
attend language and training programs; there was child care and education, 
medical care etc. There were five reception centers (EIYAAPOE 1996a:42) which 
were created between 1991 and 1993: 
                                                 
5: This was reflected in the locations of the first Hospitality Centers and Reception Settlements which 
were spread in all Central and Northern Greece (map 1). Some of them continued operating even after 
the exclusive implementation of all EIYAPOE programs in Thrace and became permanent settlements. 
6: Another characteristic of this area was, then, the low level of development. Ten years later, the pace 
of development has been accelerated but Thrace still is among the poorest areas in the European Union    
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Zigos, Kavala with a capacity of 1000 persons. 
Sapes, Rodopi with a capacity of 750 persons. 
Palagia, Evros with a capacity of 800 persons. 
Farkadona, Trikala with a capacity of 500 persons and  
Evmiro, Xanthi with a capacity of 450 persons. 
 
In the third stage refugees were moved from reception settlements to individual 
residences, mostly rented, in order to gradually get used in how to manage their 
own lives in an everyday situation. Their rent, bills for electricity, water etc. were 
subsidized but they were responsible in making the payments themselves. 
Subsidization would cease as soon as the financial situation of the refugee 
families allowed it.    
 
The final stage was the establishment of refugee families in permanent residences 
which were coming in their possession in various ways: by financing their 
purchase from the free market through low interest loans from EIYAPOE, by 
partly financing their construction in permanent settlements in EIYAPOE sites, or 
by buying ready houses in local municipalities which were constructed by 
EIYAPOE.     
 
Policy phases of the program 
The implementation period of the housing program of EIYAPOE 1991 – 2001 can 
be distinguished in three phases which signify different policy orientations, 
different financing schedules and different impacts on repatriating refugees. 
•  The first period was from 1991 to 1993 and emphasis was given to the 
reception of the refugees as well as to the organization of EIYAPOE and 
planning of its activities.  
•  The second period was from 1994 to 1999. The focus of activities was on 
creating permanent housing settlements, and providing permanent 
residences to refugees. 
•  Finally, the last period was from 2000 to 2001 and the activities of the 
Foundation were restricted to complementary actions in support of the 
policy of “aftostegasi” according to which, refugees are expected to get 
actively involved in completing the construction of their residence. This is 
also the last period of EIYAPOE, which ceased to exist after December 
2002 and legislation was introduced to arrange for the transfer of its 
property, responsibilities, pendencies etc. to other agencies of the public 
sector. The dismantling of the Foundation came as the conclusion of a 
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severe financial crisis which provoked criticism for ineffectiveness and 
mismanagement.  
 
A more detailed description of these phases will follow in order to give a better 
insight of the development of the housing project and the way that it affected the 
repatriating refugees. 
 
The first period 1991 – 1993 started with the creation of the “Hospitality 
Centers”, the temporary “Hospitality Centers” (see page 12 above) and the 
“Reception Settlements”. The Foundation had limited saying on these, since it 
was SYKEA who materialized most of them. The Hospitality Centers of all kinds 
played a very important role in the reception of the refugees but the proved to be 
very costly, so as to put in geopardy the next phases of the program. This first 
period of functioning of the Foundation the total cost of Hospitality Centers came 
up to 1,814,000,000 drahmas in 1991 values (EIYAAPOE 2002) (or 12,320,525 
Euros in today´s value), and the annual cost per person was fluctuating between 
572,000 and 940,000 drahmas in 19917 (3886 and 6385 Euros respectively in 
today´s value). The high difference in variations was due to the occasional use of 
hotels as temporary Hospitality Centers (see also page 12). Furthermore, the 
annual “hospitality” cost per person increased 65% in 1992 and 49% in 1993 and 
the number of refugees increased 150% from 1992 to 1993 (Georgoula et al 
2002:134). The Reception Settlements –which were the second stage of the 
rehabilitation/housing process of refugees- were less costly than the Hospitality 
Centers: they were made of prefabricated houses which were previously used to 
temporary accommodate population after earthquakes. Their total cost operating 
cost8 came up to 1,989,000,000 drahmas (13,509,110 Euros in present values) –
which is slightly higher than the equivalent of Hospitality Centers- but the annual 
cost per person was fluctuating between 164,000 and 279,000 drahmas in 1991 
(1109 and 1895 Euros in present values respectively) and was reduced even 
more until 1993. (Georgoula et al 2002:135).  
 
                                                 
7: The above amounts of money in drahmas reflect a reality at the beginning of ´90s when the inflation 
was running at a rate of more than 20%. Today´s inflation rate is around 3.5% and the conversion in 
Euros has been done for 2004 prices by multiplying them with a coefficient reflecting inflation during 
all these years.   
8: This cost does not include the cost of moving the houses on site and the total cost of technical 
infrastructure in the Reception Settlements of Zigos, Sapes, Palagia, Evmoiro, and Farkadona which 
reached 2,989,000,000 drahmas (8,771,827 Euros) and were paid mainly from the Ministry of 
Planning, the Environment, and Public Works.    
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During this period, besides the Hospitality Centers and the Reception 
Settlements, the Foundation went on renting houses for the third stage of the 
rehabilitation/ housing of the refugees (see page 13). The contracts were made 
between the owners of the houses and the Foundation –not the refugees 
themselves- since this was considered positive for the credibility of the 
transaction by the owners. 700 residences were rented in Thrace until the end of 
1993 and given to refugee families. The annual cost per rented house in 1993 
was between 332,000 and 397,000 drahmas (1730 and 2069 Euros respectively 
in present values) which was much lower than the cost of Hospitality Centers, but 
higher than the cost of Reception Settlements. Here should also be mentioned 
that, according to the program, the Foundation was subsidizing the rent of the 
refugee families, depending on the financial situation of the refugees9. A 
complication in this stage of the program was that very often, the repatriating 
refugees refused to pay for the other expenses of their houses (electricity, water, 
maintenance etc.) which was their formal responsibility, but it ended up to be 
paid by the Foundation. In this way, the rented accommodation stage became 
something equivalent to the Reception Settlements, and it did not work towards 
the gradual adaptation of the refugees to their new environment, as had been 
initially planned. 
 
During this period, besides rented accommodation, the Foundation also explored 
the market for permanent accommodation. The steps –either in sequence or 
alternative- followed for that, were: a. finding and acquiring land to develop, b. 
buying ready houses, c. constructing houses in land yielded to the Foundation, 
and d. create permanent settlements.   
 
Acquisition of land, in particular, was not proved successful. Until 1993, the 
Foundation acquired 714 ha of public land, a great percentage of which, was not 
suitable for construction of houses, either due to the geography of the terrain, or 
due to administrative restrictions (protected areas, green belts etc.). From the 
remaining, the highest percentage was agricultural land, quite isolated from other 
urban centers. The reasoning that prevailed and led in this choice was that new 
permanent settlements should be relatively independent and self sufficient 
(Kritikos 2002). Most permanent settlements were built on agricultural land, while 
s o m e  o t h e r s  w e r e  b u i l t  o n  a r e a s  j u s t  besides existing Reception Settlements 
                                                 
9: Very indicative for the mistrust between the Foundation and the refugees was the fact that, while 
according to Foundation sources the rent subsidization reached 70,000 drahmas (364 Euros in present 
values) per month, according to refugees´ claims this was never higher than 58,000 drahmas (302 
Euros in present values). 
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(Evmoiro in the Prefecture of Xanthi, Sappes in Rodopi, Palagia and Giannouli in 
Evros, and Zigos in Kavala). The Foundation did not participate in planning and 
construction of the settlements (see also pg 10) and this was a negative factor for 
the quality of the produced outcomes (the example of Zigos is very indicative). 
Since there was a deficit of residential land because of the above, the Foundation 
went ahead to buy land and houses in the housing estates of EKTENEPOL, near 
Xanthi and Komotini. In this way, the shortage of land was dealt, but the finances 
of the program started exhibiting a much more serious shortage. 
 
The system of granting permanent houses to refugees became also a matter of 
controversy. Houses which were to be built in permanent settlements, as well as 
the ones to be bought by the Foundation would be given to refugee families as 
“chrisidaneio” which meant that these families would live in the house for 20 
years and then they would have the right for its complete ownership. This 
measure was supposed to discourage refuge e s  t o  m o v e  a w a y  f r o m  T h r a c e  t o  
major urban centers (Athens or Thessaliniki) and keep them in the place of their 
residence (Kritikos 2002). The process of choosing which families would get a 
house was bitterly disputed. Until 1994, the choice was made according to social 
criteria by a committee with Foundation officials as members,. After 
demonstrations and criticism because of phenomena of favoritism and 
deliberately opaque procedures, the system changed to a more objective 
evaluation with indicators and weights, and ballot.  
 
As it concerns the architectural design of houses, three types were finally 
approved, for up to 5 persons (with area 95 sq.m.), 7 persons (115 sq.m.), and 9 
persons (125 sq.m.). These types were suppose to be implementable in every 
housing project, and this created some serious problems at least in one case, as 
will be seen later. 
 
Stage of housing program  Families involved  Individuals involved 
Hospitality Centers  175  609 
Reception Settlements  845  3259 
Rented Residences  700  3071 
Permanent Residences  155  663 
Total 1875  7602 
 
Table 7: Involvement of refugees in EIYAAPOE housing program during the period 
1991 – 1993.  (Source: EIYAAPOE 2002:17, Georgoula 2002:143). 
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During the second period 1994 – 1999, the Foundation put the focus of its 
activities on permanent accommodation for repatriating refugees, and on the 
creation of permanent housing settlements. The Hospitality Centers gradually had 
their role reduced. It is indicative that while during the period 1991 – 1993 they 
reached a peak of 1050 refugees being served there, at the end of 1999 there 
were only 169 of them. The Reception Settlements were also gradually 
dismandled in order for the refugees to be moved in rented accommodation. The 
m o v e  t o  t h i s  s t a g e  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i od was massive and beyond previous 
expectations, since at 1993 there were 3071 refugees who stayed in rented 
houses and at 1997 their number increased to 15000 (4029 families). The 
expenses for subsidizing the rents also increased to 2,646,000,000 drahmas 
(7765224 Euros) at 1997, and the annual cost per family was also double than 
the equivalent of the first period. These uncontrollable expenses brought criticism 
to the Foundation, which started looking increasingly as problematic, corrupt and 
ineffective. Even worse, they provoked social tensions between refugees and local 
societies who thought that refugees were getting unacceptable privileges. Under 
these conditions, the Ministry of External Affairs put pressure on the Board of 
Directors of the Foundation who, in turn, decided to cut back the subsidies. The 
reaction of the refugees and their organizations was immediate, and they 
demonstrated and occupied the offices of the Foundation in the cities of 
Alexandroupoli, Komotini, Kavala, and Xanthi, asking for the invalidation of the 
decision (Alisanoglou 1998). The outcome of the negotiations that followed was 
that cutbacks would have to be made in subsidies of refugee families who were 
financially strong. The categorization would be based in criteria set after 
cooperation between the Foundation and the refugee organizations 
(www.papandreou.gr 1998b). Consequently, the expenses due to rental subsidies 
were reduced up to 50% since 1999, partly due to the cutbacks and partly due to 
the gradual development of the fourth stage of the housing program, which 
involved moving of refugees to permanent residences. 
 
The methods used by the Foundation for materializing the permanent residence 
stage of the housing program were the following (Kritikos 1996:31): 
1.  Purchase of developed land (mainly in housing estates) near the cities of 
Xanthi and Komotini.  
2.  Transformation of the Reception Settlements of Evmiro in Xanthi, Sapes in 
Rodopi, Palagia in Evros, and Zigos in Kavala to permanent settlements. 
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3.  Preparation of urban plans and consequent creation of housing settlements 
/ estates on land, property of the Foundation. 
4.  Construction of prefabricated houses in rural municipalities, not exceeding 
in numbers 10% of the total number of houses of the municipality. 
5.  Purchase of already built houses and flats in apartment buildings. 
6.  Purchase of houses and flats under construction, which were to be 
modified and finished according to guidelines set by the Foundation.  
 
The first housing settlements were ready to be used at 1995, in Evmiro, Sapes 
and Gianouli in Evros. The capacity of these settlements and their cost are given 
in Table 8. 
 
Area  Number of residences  Total cost in EUROs 
Evmoiro (Xanthi)  88  2,072,660 
Sapes (Rodopi)  281  7,165,520 
Giannouli (Evros)  61  1,780,450 
TOTAL 430  11,018,630 
 
Table 8: Residences and costs of permanent settlements (until 1995). 
(sources: Kritikos 1996:32) 
 
The time spent for the construction of the above was considered excessive and 
the Foundation tried to justify this by claiming delays due to the legislative 
framework for public works. Consequently, it tried manuevring between 
legislation for public and private sector, with often awkward outcomes. 
Nevertheless, at the end of 1999 the number of residences in permanent 
settlements reached 693.10 and purchase of houses and flats ready to be used 
reached at 239. (EIYAAPOE 2002:21). 
 
A recapitulation of the process of the housing program at the end of the period 
1994 – 1999 is exhibited in table 9. 
                                                 
10: Even though houses in these settlements were granted to refugees, many things are still in 
abeyance, such as: the official assignment of public spaces to the municipalities which would organize 
and take care of them, the complete construction of technical infrastructure, construction works in the 
houses such as insulation, athletic facilities in some settlements etc. (Lascarakis 2002:6)  
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Stage of the housing program  Families  Individuals 
Hospitality Centers  71  169 
Reception Settlemnts  333  1066 
Rented Accommodation   3732  14031 
Permanent residences  1064  4991 
Total  5200  20257 
  
Table 9: The housing program of EIYAAPOE at the end of the period 1994 – 1999. 
(source: EIYAAPOE 2002:20, Georgoula et al 2002:156). 
 
The last period of EIYAAPOE operation was from 2000 to 2001. This period 
signifies a basic change in housing policy from the part of EIYAAPOE. The system 
of “aftostegasi” is introduced, the basic principle of which, is that the repatriating 
refugees are financially assisted to participate in the making of their own 
accommodation. During the same period, there is an effort to terminate the 
abeyances of the previous periods, although without the desired success. The 
Reception Centers gradually stopped operating, but in the Reception Settlements, 
at the end of 2001 there were still 378 families of refugees, living in prefabricated 
–looking like  bunkers- houses, in rather degrading conditions. Rented houses 
also existed, reaching at 3506 at the end of the same period, but being gradually 
reduced year by year. It is indicative that during 2001, there were 69 new 
contracts for rented accommodation and 403 discontinuances of existing 
contracts. The construction of new houses, either in permanent settlements or in 
individual constructions at this period, stopped completely from the part of the 
Foundation, but purchases of ready houses and flats continued. In the number of 
239 purchases of houses until 1999, another 111 were added, reaching at the 
end of 2001 at 350. 
 
The system of “aftostegasi” was adopted at the beginning of this period and was 
part of a general strategy aiming at rehabilitation of repatriating refugees. Its 
implementation was not aimed only at refugees participating in the housing 
program of EIYAAPOE, but at all repatriating refugees, in every part of Greece. It 
was introduced by Law 2790/2000 which was also dealing with issues regarding 
possession of Greek citizenship, training and education, professional restitution 
etc. In housing the refugees, in particular, it provided for financial assistance of 
the type of low or no interest loans, part of which of up to 30%, was given as a 
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grant. With these loans, refugees could either buy houses or flats from the free 
market, or built a house in land of their own, or built their house in land granted 
to them by the Foundation, or buy and restore existing houses or flats, old or half 
finished. In all cases, guarantor of the loan is the Greek State, something that 
gives credibility to the whole transaction. This process also provided for having 
the architectural design either made or paid by the Foundation and issuing 
construction permit for free, or, in case that the refugee undertakes the permit 
process, to have insurance expenses reduced by 50%. The amount of loan, the 
percentage of grant, the figure of interest –or the exemption of it- and the terms 
and type of assistance, in general depend on the location of the house to be 
obtained: according to this law, the locational distribution of refugees in Greece 
has to follow some rational patterns and be under control, so national territory is 
divided in four zones, each with a different “weight” in terms of the possible 
assistance. Zone A is the most favourable and it contains Thrace, East Macedonia, 
and North Aegean islands. At the opposite end, zone D is the least favourable 
one, containing Athens, Thessaloniki, Pireaus, Patras, and Herakleion, which are 
the biggest cities in Greece and refugees are discouraged to go and live there. An 
essential condition for getting a loan is also the obligation of the applying refugee 
family to live in the particular house for a minimum of 15 years before they get 
the right to rent it to someone else, or the loan has to be paid back in full. Finally, 
another element of the policy of “aftostegasi” that has to be commented, is the 
decentralized process of this policy, since the involved departments of the public 
sector belong to the Regions, Prefectures and Municipalities –the local 
administration- and not to the Ministry of External Affairs –the central 
administration- anymore. Important role for the dispatch process of “aftostegasi” 
also plays the General Secretariat of Repatriating Expatriates in creating a data 
bank with available building plots in every prefecture, covering the expenses of 
building materials for zone A, providing assistance for the bureaucratic 
procedures etc. (General Secretariat of Repatriating Expatriates 2000b:11). 
 
For the implementation of “aftostegasi” in cases that building plots were granted 
to refugees by the Foundation, EIYAAPOE acquired land from various sources and 
in various places. Land was either bought in housing estates (Kritikos 1996:30), 
or was attorned by Ministries and organizations of the public sector to the 
Foundation, or granted/leased to the Foundation by local authorities, or 
purchased in individual plots from the free market.  
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In comparison to the other policies and methods used in EIYAAPOE housing 
program, “aftostegasi” seemed to be much more operational. Until 2002, 1703 
building plots had been transferred to refugee families in order to build on them, 
1000 building permits have been issued, and in almost half of them, construction 
has already started. At the same time, 2754 applications for loans were made 
until 2002 (1655 from refugees in EIYAPOE program and 1099 from refugees not 
participating in it), 2069 of them were approved (1321 for refugees in EIYAPOE 
program and 748 for others), and 1597 have been processed.(Panoilias 2002).  
 
“Aftostegasi” has been praised as a method which drags the refugees out of a 
passive attitude –that would be the case if they were given ready and free 
houses)- and forces them to get involved in procedures of the free market 
society. Furthermore, since they make the choices about designing and 
constructing their residencies, they usually get other refugees involved too, such 
as architects, engineers, builders, trade companies for building materials etc. and 
thus, create jobs for them. Furthermore, with “aftostegasi” the process of housing 
the refugees has been speeded up, since there are no more bureaucratic delays 
affecting high numbers of houses –as was often the case with construction 
companies being contracted to build permanent settlements- and building or 
buying a house individually, as a process is much more flexible.  
 
“Aftostegasi” was rightfully characterized as an improvement from the previous 
policies of EIAPOE, but it still had its not-so-slight drawbacks. As has been 
mentioned earlier, the Foundation acquired land from various sources, in order to 
provide building plots to the refugees for building their houses. In the hastiness of 
promoting the implementation of “aftostegasi” upon the success of which, the 
Foundation laid the justification of its own existence, loans were granted, building 
plots were attorned, building licences were issued and construction of houses 
started, without having planned and constructed the technical infrastructure in 
advance. It is indicative that in Komotini, where land was bought in an urbanized 
area and “aftostegasi” proceeded as fast as possible, many refugee houses are 
ready while there are no contracts yet with construction companies to built the 
infrastructure (roads, water supply, drainage and electricity networks etc.). In 
Xanthi, respectively, even the studies for the infrastructure networks are not 
ready, while in Palagía, in Evros, there are no funds for the equivalent works. A 
main reason for these inadequacies was that these tasks were assigned by the 
Foundation to the technical services of the local municipalities, which often were 
unprepared for responsibilities of this kind. So, there were delays in preparation 
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of the studies, in submitting the appropriate files for funding to the Regional 
departments, in running the procedures for contracting companies for the 
constructions etc. The assignment of important tasks from the part of the 
Foundation to other organizations –although EIYAPOE was typically able and 
obliged to process them- seemed to be an inherent pathogenesis, from its first 
period of operation (see also pg. 9). 
 
Along with “aftostegasi”, some other measures were introduced to facilitate and 
encourage the housing rehabilitation of the refugees, that besides their 
controversial nature, they also fueled social tensions among local societies. 
According to them, illegal constructions made by refugees would be legalized, and 
no fines would be imposed. The effects of this in a society where illegal 
construction has been a serious wound for the last thirty years, can be easily 
imagined. 
 
In 12 years of operation (1990-2002), EIYAAPOE could never reach the levels of 
efficiency, managerial ability, and social recognition for which it was established. 
To the contrary, criticism was escalating against its excessive spending, 
ineffective policies, delays and mismanagement from local societies, central 
government, and the refugees who participated in its programs. Inevitably, with 
the last article of Law 3072/2002 (article 15) the dissolution of the Foundation 
was declared. An indication for its dissolution was given two years earlier, when 
immigrant and refugee issues were dealt by Law 2790/2000 in a comprehensive 
way, without maintaining for the Foundation its up to then crucial role. A common 
ministerial decision, related to Law 3072/2002, was issued by the Ministers of 
Finance, External Affairs, and the Internal Affairs and Public Administration, 
defining the way that property, liabilities, engagements etc. of the Foundation 
would pass to the equivalent Region. Regions, in their turn, were responsible to 
transfer to refugees all parts of EIYAAPOE property, related to their housing. 
Housing settlements passed to the administrative jurisdiction of local authorities, 
which became responsible for maintaining their public space, infrastructure 
networks etc.11
 
                                                 
11 There is also reference in the ministerial decision, about sources of finance for the municipalities in 
order to deal with the obligations fallen on their shoulders because of the matters in abeyance in almost 
all these settlements. The reference was, though, vague and ambigous, so local authorities were very 
uneager to accept these new responsibilities.  
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A quantitative account of the housing program of EIYAAPOE, covering the whole 
period of its operation, can be seen below (General Secretariat of Repatriating 
Expatriates 200a:40, EIYAAPOE 2002:61, Panoilias 2002). 
  
Population of repatriating refugees accommodated in the areas of EIYAAPOE 
activities (Thrace, East Macedonia): 8140 families (27700 persons). 
Population of repatriating refugees, participating in the housing program of the 
Foundation: 6225 families (20257 persons) (72% of the total population 
accommodated in these areas). 
Building plots granted to refugees (until 31/12/2001): 1438. 
Unfinished residences12 granted to refugees (until 31/12/2001): 43 in Evmoiro, 
Xanthi, and 114 in Zigos, Kavala.13
Residences not distributed yet (until 31/12/2001): 5 in Xanthi and 7 in Komotini. 
Approved loans: 2069. 
Processed loans: 1597. 
Quality of refugee residences14: 46% of good quality. 
           50% of average quality. 
            4% of bad quality. 
 
Evaluation of EIYAAPOE housing program and impact on the refugees 
In an effort to estimate the problems that seriously affected EIYAAPOE housing 
program and evaluate the attempted solutions, one should start from the first 
period of the operation of the Foundation 1991-1993. At the end of this period it 
was obvious that the selected sites for Reception Settlements and consequently, 
the proposed sites for housing settlements had a major disadvantage: being 
mostly in rural and often isolated areas, provided limited opportunities for 
employment, and especially to refugees that were living and working in urban 
centers in former Soviet Union. Hence, many refugee families were reluctant to 
establish themselves permanently in these areas and either went straight to 
Athens and Thessaloniki, or they tried to do it at a later stage, after being 
through the first stages of the housing program, jeopardizing thus, or violating 
the regulations of the Foundation. This seemed to be an inherent problem of the 
policy of the Foundation which tended to ignore the professional and cultural past 
of the refugees by treating all of them as unskilled workers, and did not try to 
                                                 
12: Supposed to finish by the refugees, either by paying for the expenses, or by putting personal work 
on it.  
13: Definitive certificates of houses to refugees have not been given yet in Zigos, since the ballot 
procedure was twice invalidated because of refugee reactions.   
14: Information according to a statistical research by EIYAAPOE, where 1818 residences were 
inspected. 
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look at individual and particular characteristics, and combine them with suitable 
alternatives for their housing rehabilitation. It also seemed that by exclusively 
implementing the EIYAAPOE housing program in Thrace, the Foundation and the 
Ministry of External Affairs formulated a policy serving a questionable “national 
need”15 and ignored the real needs and the well being of the refugees.  
 
Scheduling of the various stages of the program was completely out of target, 
since the objective of transferring 7000 refugees per year from Hospitality 
Centers and Reception Settlements to the next stages of the program (rented 
accommodation and permanent residences) was proved impossible. Delays due to 
inability to find appropriate residential land forced refugee families to stay in 
Hospitality Centers for many months, instead of the initially planned 15-30 days, 
and in Reception Settlements for years, instead of the initially planned 6 months. 
These delays had very negative consequences for both, the living conditions of 
the refugees, and the finances of the program.16   
 
Even after the acquisition of housing land, huge delays were also imposed to the 
housing program due to the bureaucratic procedures concerning approval of 
urban plans, contracting for works etc. (Kritikos 2002). Although this was used as 
an excuse, one could positively claim that the Foundation beared part of the 
responsibility for these delays, since, instead of assuming these tasks with its 
own personnel and resources, it was conveying crucial responsibilities to other 
public organizations (see also pages 9, 22), which simply would not do the job 
properly and on time. It is indicative that in the case of the permanent settlement 
of Zigos in the Prefecture of Kavala, EIYAAPOE had contracted DEPOS (National 
Corporation of Urban Planning and Housing) for managing and supervising the 
constructions of new houses. The standard architectural designs for three types of 
houses were given to DEPOS in order to make the necessary changes and adjust 
them to the physical terrain. DEPOS did not make the adjustments, the 
construction company went ahead with the unchanged plans, and there was mass 
production of houses with illegal basements which appeared due to the slope of 
the terrain. This, of course halted the whole project because none of the involved 
                                                 
15: In Thrace there is a Muslem minority which has traditionally been treated by successive Greek 
governments with suspicion, as a potential ally of the neighbouring Turkey in cases of tension between 
the two countries. Repatriating refugees settled in Thrace, according to this policy, could be used to 
counterbalance the Muslim influence there.  
16: It is indicative that in many Reception Settlements refugees had to stay for years in prefabricated 
houses with no provision of heating. So, during the harsh winter of Thrace, they were trying to warm 
up these houses by keeping the electric stoves and the ovens on. This, of course, did not warm the 
places properly, and, at the same time, ejected the electricity costs –which were paid by the 
Foundation- sky high. 
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parts was eager to assume responsibility and pay the fines for the illegal 
constructions. (Voudiklaris 1999, Syropouloy 2004).    
 
Another problem which became very serious at the end of the second period of 
the housing program (1994-1999), was the excessive expansion of the costs for 
rented accommodation, which was partly created because of the effort of the 
Foundation to invert the delays of the previous stages of the program. This did 
not only jeopardize the financial situation of the Foundation but also provoked 
severe tensions between the Foundation and the refugees (see also page 17). 
 
Finally, this period was also characterized by the manuevering of the Foundation 
between legislation for public and private sector, with often awkward 
outcomes.(see page 18). 
 
The third –and last- period of the program (2000-2001) was characterized by the 
system of “aftostegasi” which was, in general, more effective than the previous 
systems and policies adopted. The negative point of the implementation of 
“aftostegasi” was, as mentioned earlier, (see page 21) the delays in studying, 
financing and constructing the technical infrastructure in permanent settlements, 
where refugees had already gone ahead in building their houses. “Aftostegasi” 
was preserved as a method –and it is still used- even after EIYAAPOE was 
dismandled.  
 
As a general evaluation for the whole housing program, one can say that at the 
end of it, there was a very limited number of refugee families with permanent 
accommodation (see page 23), in comparison to the number of families who 
participated in the housing program. Furthermore, the high number of families 
that still live in rented accommodation –and given the present financial 
constraints- poses some serious questions about the possibility of ever coming 
close to the initial objective of the program, to guarantee permanent 
accommodation for most of the refugee families. 
 
In general, the housing program, as it worked, was not the much needed policy 
for refugee rehabilitation with long term effects and social content. It was rather 
an emergency measure to cover immediate needs. There was even speculation 
that in the way it was set up, it was mostly to serve political tendentiousness 
such as to gain immediate political support from the repatriating refugees, to 
create an organization which could attract European funds, and to accommodate 
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political friends in it. The way that the Foundation was staffed is quite indicative. 
At 1992 there were approximately 400 employees, the great majority of whose 
was low ranking personnel (secretaries, drivers, guards etc.) while engineers, 
psychologists, social workers etc. were almost non existing (there were only 4 
engineers in the Foundation at that time (Kritikos 2002)) and administrative costs 
were extremely high.   
 
During its operation, EIYAAPOE was also accused for preferential treatment 
towards some construction companies (Voudiklaris 1999:6), for unjustified 
payments to hotel owners for renting rooms for refugees, for excessive estimates 
in the prices of purchased houses and flats and so on. Furthermore, there were 
cases that preferential treatments and peculiar transactions with private 
companies were made by the subcontractors to which EIYAAPOE had conveyed 
management of its projects. (Voudiklaris 1999). Finally, there was interruption of 
the grants and loans which the Foundation was getting from the Social 
Rehabilitation Fund of European Council, after 1996, since, whereas these money 
was supposed to be used only for constructing houses in new settlements, it was 
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